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Abstract: I fully support the continuum proposed in the target article and argue along the same
lines that we should be suspicious of drawing any strict borders between human and non-human
animals. Since we can say very little with absolute certainty about human intentions regarding
suicide, we have no certainty about the intentions of non-human animals. Although I am very
sympathetic to Peña-Guzmán’s overall argument, I suggest that time could be taken into
consideration as well.
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Whenever we end up comparing human and non-human animals, we typically end up arguing for
or against “giving” animals a seemingly positive attribute, such as intelligence, feelings, making
decisions, etc. One interesting aspect of Peña-Guzmán’s (2017) target article is that he focuses on
a very negative aspect of human life, suicide, and makes a strong case that other animals might
be able to decide to end their lives.
A lot is at stake here: reflexive subjectivity, free will, and awareness of death (discussed in
the first part) on the side of the non-human animal, as well as the human animal. For, what do
we really understand about suicide? We probably all know at least one person who has attempted
or committed suicide. We understand that they are suffering tremendously, and we feel
compassion, but I cannot say that I fully understand their reasons for wanting to end their lives.
Furthermore, do they fully understand it themselves? Did they make a rational decision? Do they
understand the consequences of their act? What is their intention? In short, what exactly is
human suicide?1 When it comes to non-human animals, with whom we have trouble
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As an example of decision-making regarding suicide, we can take the 2006 documentary The Bridge, which
tells the story of people who commit suicide by jumping off the Golden Gate Bridge. Several people are
filmed jumping off the bridge, toward their death. It is extraordinary how casual this act appears to be. One
moment they stand on the edge, the next they step off, as if they get off a bus on the way to work. A few
moments later, they hit the water and die instantly. One person who survived is interviewed and shares that
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communicating, all these questions become even harder to answer. Yet, when I observe animals
in confinement such as in zoos, “Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations,” or laboratories, I
quickly ascertain (on what could be considered an “instinctual level”) that these animals (1) do
not live a life worth living and (2) would be better off dead. Whether they themselves think about
it in a similar way is harder to determine.2
Peña-Guzmán engages with and disputes convincingly the different arguments that deny
animal suicide. One aspect I missed in his discussion is an engagement with time. As Nietzsche
(1989, "Second Essay") argues, it is our inability to forget the past that makes us feel guilt and that
torments us. In relation to suicide, we can say that many mental health issues that result in suicide
are related to traumatic stress disorder. If we could only forget the past! If an animal forgets the
past – I am not suggesting this is the case – a similar kind of trauma would not be possible.
Committing suicide because of a traumatic experience (loss of freedom, losing one’s offspring
soon after they are born, living in a world of feces, etc.) is not a possibility if they do not remember
it. On the other hand, if we think about the future, Heidegger (famously) determines the essence
of our being as time (and rejects the possibility that non-human animals can relate to time “as
such”) (see Kuperus 2007). The fundamental attunement of anxiety describes the situation in
which one relates to one’s death (or “the nothing”) and recognizes one’s own finitude. I recognize
myself as time, time that is ticking away (Heidegger 1962). Everyone has experienced this anxiety,
and it is this recognition of our own mortality that makes the decision to commit suicide such a
serious and radical act. This returns us to Peña-Guzmán’s discussion of the awareness of death.
Whether other animals are able to experience Heideggerian anxiety over their own
finitude is an interesting academic question, yet I would also emphasize that the question is
coming out of a mindset that is suspicious of animals’ abilities. All the arguments against the
possibility of animal suicide are representative of the Cartesian model that has dominated our
thinking about animals. This model presents us with animals as mere machines that, for example,
might kill themselves instinctually, without any real agency, subjectivity, free will, awareness of
the moment he jumped he changed his mind and wanted to live. He made sure to land feet first and
miraculously survived (apparently with the aid of a black seal, which he explains as a sign from God).
2
We could be making a horrible mistake if we simply acted on our assumption that animals do not have the
ability to wish to end their lives. What do we really do to an animal when we lock it up, for example? A book
such as What a Fish Knows: The Inner Lives of our Underwater Cousins (Balcombe 2016a,b) truly challenges
our sense that fishes (even goldfishes) lack intelligence. On a more personal level, this winter break, before
reading Peña-Guzmán’s essay, we had some non-human visitors in our house: five fishes. They came from
the (vacationing) household of my son’s best friend. The fish (two goldfishes and three guppies) were in a
nice aquarium, with equipment such as a filter, lights, and heater, as well as a little (fake) submarine, fake
plants, and some (real!) rocks on the bottom. The backside had a print of a coral reef glued to it. The fish
were in a clean (albeit largely artificial) environment, well-fed, and living without the threat of predators
(assuming they were not going to eat one another). Yet, as soon as they were in our home, I started to
wonder about their existence. Whether fish have rational capacities or live purely instinctually (or whatever
we want to call their natural drives), there is no doubt about this simple fact: these fish are locked up, are
unable to explore or act on their natural instincts, and it seems that the only thing they can look forward to
is their daily feeding (which they were obviously rather obsessed about). I remembered the goldfish we had
in a bowl when I was young. They never lived very long. Was that because we did not take good enough care
of them, because their environment was not healthy, or was it possible that they somehow ended their own
lives? The very fact that, as Peña-Guzmán shows, we cannot answer this question clearly, should make us
think twice before locking up a fish or any other animal.
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death or intentionality. I really appreciate the target article’s approach regarding a continuum.
Why indeed would non-human animals be so radically different? Why would a human suicide be
a rational, free choice, with clear intentions and an understanding of the consequences of the act
– all of this can be brought into question, as is pointed out – whereas a non-human animal lacks
all of these? We should shift away from the paradigm of the Cartesian abyss of difference between
human rationality and animal instincts. This means, first of all, questioning the idea of human
exceptionalism. We are part of nature, just one of its many parts – nothing too special. As Spinoza
(1992) points out, humans are mistaken when they think that they are free by virtue of their ability
to be aware of wishes and desires.3 Who we are, what we do, and omit to do, is determined
through forces that are outside our control. We are mistaken when we think we freely choose,
whether we are choosing to buy a gadget, which beer or wine to drink (or not to drink at all), or
whether to end or not end our lives. We are also endowed with a conscience and have learned
that ending our lives is a sin. If animals are not bothered by a conscience (as we mostly assume),
could we perhaps even suggest that suicide may be more common in the non-human animal?
In closing, I want to thank Peña-Guzmán for his marvelous work on the issue of animal
suicide. It is a clear engagement with the issue and should make all readers seriously reconsider
the question.
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Spinoza (1992) writes that “men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions
and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish
and desire” (Appendix Part I).
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